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Article 6

The Role of the Exhaustion and Ripeness Doctrines in
Reasonable Accommodation Denial Suits Under the Fair
Housing Amendments Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. seemingly resolved the question of when a
locality may require a disabled party to appeal an adverse
accommodation request. 1 There, a nursing home operator sued Howard
County for failing to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair
Housing Act to allow it to expand its operation. 2 The County argued that
because the operator failed to appeal the County’s preliminary decision
denying the reasonable accommodation request to the County Board of
Appeals, the operator failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. 3
Additionally, Howard County argued that because the operator failed to
complete the administrative process by failing to appeal, the claim was
unripe for judicial determination. 4
The Fourth Circuit rejected the exhaustion defense argument,
holding that the Fair Housing Act provides that a reasonable
accommodation plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies. 5 The
court rejected the ripeness argument on the ground that a reasonable
accommodation violation occurs when the petitioner is first denied their
request, and is therefore sufficiently concrete, regardless of the
availability of subsequent administrative proceedings. 6
This Note argues that Bryant Woods Inn has summarily and
incorrectly foreclosed the possibility of a judicially-imposed exhaustion
requirement. Analogizing to the same takings jurisprudence to which the
court referred in its foreclosure, this Note argues that prudential ripeness
counsels against judicial involvement in reasonable accommodation
disputes until the prescribed administrative process has been completed.

1. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County Maryland, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997).
While this case is over ten years old, the correctness of its holding that a party need not exhaust its
locality-provided administrative remedies has not been challenged by court or commentator, and it
has been cited.
2. Id. at 599–601.
3. Id. at 601.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 602.
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First, this Note provides a brief background on the Fair Housing Act
of 1968 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. Next, it
explores ripeness and exhaustion doctrines in general. Third, it argues
that Bryant Woods Inn has incorrectly interpreted Congressional intent
with respect to the elimination of an administrative remedy exhaustion
requirement. Finally, it analogizes that just as a plaintiff must invoke
multi-step administrative procedures for just compensation after an
alleged taking before a taking claim is ripe for judicial resolution, so
should a plaintiff have to invoke multi-step administrative procedures for
a reasonable accommodation before an FHA violation claim is ripe.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, popularly known as The Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”), was enacted by Congress in 1968 in response to
the civil unrest of the mid 1960s. 7 As originally passed, the FHA
protected individuals from discrimination in the sale or rental of housing
based on race, color, religion, or national origin. 8 In 1974, Congress
amended the FHA to add a prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of sex. 9
In 1988, in what was widely seen as a major victory for the civil
rights movement in its quest to improve the enforcement of the FHA, 10
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”). 11 In
addition to its primary goal of improving enforcement of the 1968 act, 12
especially with respect to the prohibition against racial discrimination, 13
the FHAA was passed to protect handicapped individuals and families
with children from discrimination. 14

7. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 15 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176.
8. PUB. L. 90-284, § 804 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2000)).
9. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, PUB. L. 93-383, § 808(b)(1).
10. See, e.g. Thomas J. Leuck, The New Teeth in the Fair Housing Law, N.Y. TIMES, March
12, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/12/realestate/the-new-teeth-in-the-fairhousing-law.html (“‘The law is a big victory,’ said Wade Henderson, a lawyer with the American
Civil Liberties Union in Washington. ‘It provides the missing link in the enforcement stream of the
American civil rights movement.’”).
11. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, PUB. L. 100-430 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 36013619 (2000)).
12. H.R. REP. 100-711, at 15 (1988) (“The Committee, after extensive review and analysis
over a number of Congresses, views [the current limited means for enforcing the law] as the primary
weakness in existing law.” (emphasis added)).
13. Id. (discussing housing discrimination and segregation solely in the context of race).
14. Id. at 17-19; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606.
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A. FHAA’s Enforcement Provisions
The 1968 Act’s enforcement provisions gave Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) only limited power in instances of individual
discrimination to “eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.” 15 The Act gave the Attorney General the power to enforce it
in federal court, but only against persons who had “engaged in a pattern
or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted
by [the] title.” 16 While the Act permitted individuals to enforce the law
in federal court against violations that did not constitute a pattern or
practice, it limited recovery of attorneys’ fees to those plaintiffs who
were financially unable to pay them. 17
By 1988, there was bipartisan agreement that the enforcement
provisions needed strengthening due to HUD’s lack of power to sue
violators 18 and litigants’ financial inability to do so. 19 Thus, the FHAA
provided a new remedy—the administrative proceeding. 20 Noting that
states and federal agencies have economically and efficiently used
administrative proceedings for many years, the House Judiciary
Committee Report stated that “[i]f conciliation fails . . ., then HUD can
bring the case to a hearing before an administrative law judge. Because
HUD can continue to enforce the law if the conciliation is unsuccessful,
there is a real incentive for both parties to conciliate and resolve the
complaint in the early stages.” 21 However, Congress took care to note
that the creation of this new administrative proceeding remedy was not to
impair individuals’ ability to bring a civil action against those parties that
discriminated against them. Rather, “[t]he Committee intend[ed] for the
administrative proceeding to be a primary, but not exclusive, method for
persons aggrieved by discriminatory housing practices to seek redress.” 22
As an additional enforcement-strengthening provision, the FHAA
eliminated the FHA’s attorneys’ fee recovery provision, allowing the
15. PUB. L. 90-284, § 810(c).
16. Id. at § 813(a) (emphasis added).
17. Id. § 812(c).
18. H.R. REP. 100-711, at 16-17, n.20 (1988) (“The gap in enforcement is the lack of a
forceful back-up mechanism which provides an incentive to bring the parties to the conciliation
table . . . [T]he exclusive reliance upon voluntary resolution is . . . an[] invitation to intransigence.
Reform of the Fair Housing Act is a necessity that is acknowledged by all.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 17; 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (2000).
21. H.R. REP. 100-711, at 5; 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (providing that if a complainant or
respondent elects not to have his HUD charge of unlawful discrimination adjudicated in federal
court, the Secretary of HUD shall set a hearing before an administrative law judge).
22. H.R. REP. 100-711, at 23.
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court, or administrative law judge, to award attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party regardless of his ability to otherwise pay them. 23 Finally,
the FHAA eliminated the “pattern or practice” limitation with respect to
the violations against which the Attorney General may sue on behalf of
the aggrieved individual. 24 Thus, the FHAA improves the FHA’s
enforcement provisions by instituting an administrative process, allowing
all parties to be awarded attorney’s fees, and providing full enforcement
powers to HUD.
B. FHAA’s Handicapped and Familial Status Provisions
The FHAA’s secondary purpose is to extend equal housing
protection to the handicapped and families with children. 25 It defines
handicap broadly, as a person who has “a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life
activities.” 26 This definition purposefully mirrors the definition of
handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”), presumably with
the intent that the case law defining “substantially limits,” and “major
life activities” under the RA would aid courts in deciding cases under the
FHAA. 27
The reasonable accommodation provision of the FHAA, with which
this Note is particularly concerned, provides that discrimination under
the FHAA includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in
rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling.” 28 As with the definition of handicap, Congress relied on the
long history of RA case law to help define the concept of reasonable
accommodation. 29 While the statute fails to indicate whether the
reasonable accommodation requirement was intended to apply to zoning,
the House Judiciary Committee Report states that “[t]he Committee
intend[ed] that the prohibition against discrimination against those with

23. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) (stating that the ALJ or court may award attorney’s fees and costs to
the prevailing party, so long as the party is not the United States).
24. Id. § 3612(o)(1).
25. H.R. REP. 100-711 at 13.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1).
27. H.R. REP. 100-711 at 13 (1988) (“Handicapped persons have been protected from some
forms of discrimination since Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the bill uses the
same definitions and concepts from that well-established law.”). “The Committee intends that the
definition be interpreted consistent with regulations clarifying the meaning of the similar provision
found in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 22.
28. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, PUB. L. 100-430 § 804(f)(3)(B) (1988).
29. H.R. REP. 100-711 at 25.
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handicaps [as provided by Section 804(f)(2)] apply to zoning decisions
and practices.” 30
Thus, Congress enacted the FHAA to achieve two separate goals: (1)
Enhance the ability of individuals and the government to enforce antidiscrimination law by, inter alia, creating a lower-cost, 31 easier-to-use 32
administrative proceeding, and (2) expand the coverage of the FHA to
include the handicapped and families with children. The next section
explores the history of the ripeness and exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrines. Following this history, this Note argues that the
Committee’s intention that a party need not exhaust the administrative
proceeding has no relation to the locality-provided reasonable
accommodation hearing process. Additionally, this Note argues that
takings jurisprudence suggests that some reasonable accommodation
controversies may not be ripe until the locality-provided reasonable
accommodation hearing process has been completed.
III. RIPENESS, FINALITY, AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
Several gatekeeping mechanisms exist through which a court may
avoid or defer examining controversies involving administrative
agencies. 33 Central among these mechanisms are the doctrines of
ripeness, finality of agency action, and the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. 34 Each doctrine has important implications for the reasonable
accommodation process in the zoning context.
The basic rationale behind the ripeness doctrine is that courts should
avoid becoming entangled in abstract disagreements. 35 There are two
types of ripeness doctrines. The first, constitutional ripeness, serves as a
limitation on the judiciary’s power. 36 The second, prudential ripeness, is

30. Id. at 24.
31. See id. at 16 (noting that the FHA’s enforcement has been hampered by the “limited
financial resources of . . . litigants.”)
32. By creating an internal administrative judiciary system, the FHAA allows the HUD to
enforce the law “in-house,” whereas under the FHA, if the HUD’s conciliation efforts failed, the
aggrieved party’s only option, at least where the offense didn’t constitute a pattern or practice, was
to proceed on its own in a civil action. See infra Section III.A; supra note 18; H. R. REP 100-711 at
16, n.16. “In order to redress the ordinary individual case of discrimination, the victim of
discrimination must bring a lawsuit in court.” Id.
33. R. George Wright, The Timing of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions: The Use
and Abuse of Overlapping Doctrines, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 83, 83 (1987).
34. Id.
35. Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1966) (overruled on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)).
36. Id. at 357.
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a more flexible doctrine that helps courts avoid adjudicating disputes that
may resolve themselves. 37
The following section distinguishes the two types of ripeness and
explains how the concepts of finality and exhaustion apply under each. 38
A. Constitutional Ripeness
Article III of the United States Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends to those cases and controversies that arise under
the Constitution. 39 Constitutional ripeness limits the judiciary to deciding
only those cases and controversies that have taken concrete form. 40 The
doctrine “prevents courts from declaring the meaning of the law in a
vacuum and from constructing generalized legal rules unless the
resolution of an actual dispute requires it.” 41 Because constitutional
ripeness is a jurisdictional prerequisite, a court must note its absence sua
sponte should a party fail to raise the issue. 42
While a ripeness inquiry will generally consist of two prongs, the
“fitness of issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration,” 43 the latter is not relevant to
constitutional ripeness but only to prudential ripeness. 44 To determine
whether an issue is fit for review, courts consider the type of alleged
harm, the finality of an agency’s decision, and whether it would be futile
for the aggrieved party to go through further proceedings. 45 Finality is
concerned with whether the “initial decision maker has arrived at a
definite position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.” 46
Futility is an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement—for example, where a party can show that an agency has

37. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008).
38. While the doctrines of ripeness, finality, and exhaustion of administrative remedies are
said to all overlap, each relating to the timing of an action, when viewed through the lens of
administrative agency action, ripeness is a “generic concept dealing with the related doctrines of
exhaustion of remedies, finality and ripeness.” Wright, supra note 33, at 84. Therefore, this Note
treats the doctrines of exhaustion and finality as being somewhat subsumed into ripeness. While this
may be overly simplistic, the extent of the doctrines’ overlap is beyond this Note’s scope.
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, 528 F.3d at 131.
41. Id. (quoting Simmonds v. I.N.S., 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003)).
42. Simmonds, 326 F.3d at 358, n.8.
43. Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (overruled on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)).
44. McInnis-Misenor v. Maine Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2003).
45. Marriott Senior Living Servs., Inc. v. Springfield Twp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 376, 386 (E.D. Pa
1999).
46. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193
(1985).
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predetermined its position, it is not required to go through the formal,
foredoomed process of applying for relief to that agency. 47
A party’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies, like a failure
to demonstrate constitutional ripeness, can also bar a federal court from
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, where the exhaustion of
remedies are prescribed by statute. 48 Exhaustion is strongly tied to the
finality requirement and the boundary between the two is unclear. 49
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City stated the
distinction between the two as:
[T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial
decisionmaker has arrived at a definite position on the issue that inflicts
an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers
to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party
may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the
decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. 50

Finally, the distinction between exhaustion of administrative
remedies and primary jurisdiction warrants review. The difference
between primary jurisdiction and exhaustion is that “primary jurisdiction
determines whether a court or an agency has initial jurisdiction;
exhaustion determines whether review may be had of agency action that
is not the last agency word in the matter.” 51 In other words “the
exhaustion doctrine prevents premature judicial interference with
administrative proceedings, while the primary jurisdiction doctrine
denies jurisdiction where agency proceedings have not yet begun.” 52
Under either, a case or controversy may not have taken sufficient form
for the dispute to be constitutionally ripe.

47. United States v. Vill. of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994); Tucker v. Def.
Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Ctr., 607 F.Supp 1232, 1243–44 (D. R.I. 1985).
48. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (“The doctrine provides ‘that no
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
remedy has been exhausted.’” (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51
(1938))).
49. Wright, supra note 33, at 85.
50. 473 U.S. at 193.
51. Wright, supra note 33, at 90 (quoting B. SCHWARTZ ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.23,
at 485. (2d ed. 1984).
52. Wright, supra note 33, at 90 (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 51 at 486).
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B. Prudential Ripeness
Where constitutional ripeness serves as a jurisdictional bar,
prudential ripeness is a more flexible doctrine courts use, inter alia, to
promote judicial efficiency. 53 Under the doctrine of prudential ripeness, a
court may refrain from hearing a case even where it involves a concrete
dispute affecting constitutionally recognizable rights. 54 Furthermore, the
doctrine serves as “an important exception to the usual rule that where
jurisdiction exists a federal court must exercise it.” 55 Thus, prudential
ripeness is unlike constitutional ripeness, where the initial decision
maker has failed to come to a definite position or where the aggrieved
party has not exhausted the statutorily prescribed administrative remedy.
Rather, under prudential ripeness, a court may choose to refrain from
deciding a case where it “will be better decided later.” 56
The elements of fitness and hardship must be analyzed to determine
whether a case or controversy is prudentially ripe. 57 The fitness analysis
“is concerned with whether the issues sought to be adjudicated are
contingent on future events or may never occur.” 58 The existence of an
administrative remedy may prevent adjudication indefinitely. For
example, in American Savings Bank, FSB v. UBS Financial Services,
Inc, the court abstained from hearing a dispute because the case was not
yet prudentially ripe, reasoning in part that “[t]he fact that [the plaintiff]
has not yet exhausted its administrative remedies counsels in favor of
invoking the prudential ripeness doctrine.” 59 The court noted, with
implicit approval, the trial court’s determination that “judicial economy
and common sense dictate that a party cannot circumvent agency
regulations by seeking court intervention before it has exhausted its
administrative remedies.” 60 In addition to the judicial economy
consideration, “notions of administrative autonomy require that the
agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors.” 61
The hardship prong considers whether a litigant will suffer harm and
the extent of the harm if the court decides to defer adjudicating the
53. Simmonds v. I.N.S. 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
54. Id.
55. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008); McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992) (“[F]ederal courts are vested with a ‘virtually unflagging
obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction given to them.” quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976))).
56. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, 528 F.3d at 131.
57. Id. at 131, 134.
58. American Savings Bank, FSB v. UBS Financial Servs. Inc., 347 F.3d 436, 440 (2d Cir.
2003) (quoting Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 478 (2d Cir. 1989)).
59. Id. at 440.
60. Id. at 439.
61. McKart v. United States, 295 U.S. 185, 195 (1969).
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controversy. 62 In assessing this prong, a court will “ask whether the
challenged action creates a direct and immediate dilemma for the
parties.” 63 The possibility of a future injury is insufficient to constitute
hardship unless the possibility creates a present detriment. 64
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine serves two
purposes—to promote administrative autonomy and to enhance the
efficiency of administrative agencies and the judiciary. 65 The
requirement may be imposed either by statute or by judicial discretion. 66
This section distinguishes between statutorily and judicially imposed
exhaustion requirements and their implications on constitutional and
prudential ripeness.
Statutory requirements that a party exhaust its administrative
remedies implicate constitutional ripeness. This is especially true in
zoning disputes, where local or state agencies are tasked with applying
zoning regulations. For, a court is unable to adjudicate a concrete dispute
unless it knows how far a regulation may go, and it is unable to
determine how far the regulation may go until the aggrieved party has
exhausted its administrative remedies. 67 Additionally, “[w]hen the
Legislature vests exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency, trial
courts have no jurisdiction over claims governed by the relevant statute
until the administrative process is exhausted.” 68
Judicially imposed exhaustion, on the other hand, implicates
prudential ripeness. The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that
exhaustion can be a matter of judicial discretion in McCarthy v.
Madigan. 69 There, the Court noted that exhaustion gives deference to
Congressional delegation to administrative agencies, and exhaustion is of
particular concern where the dispute involves the agency’s discretionary
power. 70 The Court reiterated the principle that an agency should be
62. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, 528 F.3d at 134.
63. Id. (quoting Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469, 478 (2d Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
64. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, 528 F.3d at 134.
65. 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 81 (2009).
66. Id. § 80.
67. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985).
68. State v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 223 S.W.3d 309, 311 (Tex. 2007).
69. 503 U.S. 140, 144–49 (1992) superseded on other grounds by statute, Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), as recognized in Kakaygeesick v. Salazar,
656 F. Supp. 2d 964, 979 (D. Minn. 2009) (“Nevertheless, as an exposition of the salutary purposes
of administrative exhaustion, McCarthy continues to have legitimacy and force.”).
70. Id. at 145 (“[T]he exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to
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given the chance to find and fix its own mistakes before defending its
actions in federal court. 71 Further, the Court recognized that the
exhaustion requirement promotes judicial efficiency by mooting the
controversy when the agency corrects its errors and by allowing the
parties to develop a more substantial factual record for judicial review. 72
Counterbalancing the administrative autonomy and judicial efficiency
concerns is the “virtually unflagging obligation” federal courts have to
exercise jurisdiction when it is given to them. 73 A court may therefore
choose to refrain from requiring exhaustion where the remedy would
prejudice the individual’s ability to bring a federal claim, where doubt
exists about whether the agency has the power to grant relief, and where
the administrative body has predetermined the issue. 74 Thus, the hardship
prong of the prudential ripeness analysis mirrors the exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement. Just as a litigant may have their otherwise
prudentially-unripe claim heard where they face immediate harm, a
litigant may have their otherwise administratively unexhausted claim
heard where their federal claim may be prejudiced or they may be unable
to obtain relief from the administrative agency.
Thus, failure to exhaust administrative remedies can cause a dispute
to be constitutionally unripe where the administrative process is
necessary for the dispute to take shape, or it can cause a dispute to be
prudentially unripe, where principles of judicial economy and a desire to
allow an administrative agency the opportunity to correct its own errors
counsels against judicial intervention.
IV. MISAPPLICATION OF CONGRESSIONAL EXHAUSTION INTENT IN
BRYANT WOODS INN
This section explains how, given the legislative history of the FHAA,
Bryant Woods Inn has misconstrued the legislative intent with respect to
whether a court may require a party to exhaust the locality-provided
administrative remedies.

Congress’ delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that agencies, not the
courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to
administer.”).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 145–46.
73. Id. at 146 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817–18 (1976)).
74. Id. at 146–49.
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A. Factual and Procedural Background
In Bryant Woods Inn, a nursing home operator brought suit against
Howard County for failure to make a reasonable accommodation under
the Fair Housing Act after Howard County denied the nursing home’s
request to expand its operation from eight to fifteen residents. 75 The suit
came after a hearing before the Howard County Planning Board where
residents opposed the expansion, arguing that it did not fit with the
character of the neighborhood and lacked sufficient parking to support
the expansion. 76 The Board denied the application and the nursing
home’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The nursing home
subsequently failed to appeal to the Howard County Board of Appeals as
allowed in the Howard County Code. 77
The district court spent substantial effort considering whether to
impose an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. 78 The
court questioned whether the county’s decision “ha[d] the requisite
degree of finality to satisfy traditional prudential requirements for federal
court review of challenged state administrative actions, which can
involve such often interrelated issues as ripeness [and]
exhaustion . . . .” 79 The district court relied on McCarthy v. Madigan
which held that, the intentions of Congress govern whether an exhaustion
requirement should be imposed, but where Congress is silent on the
matter, the court has discretion to impose such a requirement. 80 The
court reasoned that none of the McCarthy factors that might weigh
against imposing a ripeness requirement—prejudice to the individual’s
ability to bring a federal claim, doubt about whether the agency has the
power to grant relief, and the agency’s predetermination of the issue—
were present. 81 However, the court was concerned that no reported case
in which plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies caused it
to be denied relief from the courts. 82 Additionally, the court concluded
that an appeal to the Howard County Board of Appeals was not required
because the county’s appeals process was not clearly apparent. 83
With respect to finality and ripeness, the district court reasoned that
the County’s decision was ripe and final because it constituted Howard
County law and restricted the nursing home operator from expanding his
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Bryant Woods Inn v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 599–601 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 600–01.
Bryant Woods Inn v. Howard County, 911 F. Supp. 918, 926–27 (D. Md. 1996).
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 926–27.
Id. at 927.
Id.
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operations. Thus, the district court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the
nursing home’s claim even though it was “on the margin of federal
judicial power”. 84
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court failed to consider whether
there might be room for a judicially-imposed exhaustion requirement.
The court rejected the County’s argument that the nursing home needed
to have exhausted its administrative remedies prior to bringing suit and
concluded “the Fair Housing Act provides otherwise. It permits private
enforcement of the Fair Housing Act ‘whether or not [an administrative]
complaint has been filed.’” 85 In support of its conclusion the court
reasoned that the House Judiciary Committee Report on the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 stated that “[a]n aggrieved person is not
required to exhaust the administrative process before filing a civil action.
The Committee intends for the administrative proceeding to be a
primary, but not exclusive, method for persons aggrieved by
discriminatory housing practices to seek redress.” 86 However, the
following section demonstrates that the court misinterpreted this
statement and misapplied it to the administrative appeals process.
B. Textual Analysis
The Bryant Woods Inn Court’s reasoning demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of the intent of Congress when it
explicitly stated the FHAA may be privately enforced even if an
administrative complaint had not been filed and of the intent of the
Judiciary Committee when it stated there was no exhaustion requirement.
A review of the relevant text of the statute in context readily reveals the
error. Section 3610(1)(A)(i) addresses the process whereby an aggrieved
party filed a complaint with the HUD Secretary and provides that “[a]n
aggrieved person may, not later than one year after an alleged
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated, file a
complaint with the Secretary alleging such discriminatory housing
practice. The Secretary, on the Secretary’s own initiative, may also file
such a complaint.” 87
Section 3613(a)(1)(B)(2) refers to the above section and provides
that “[a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil action under this
subsection whether or not a complaint has been filed under section

84. Id. at 928.
85. Id. at 926.
86. Bryant Woods Inn v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 601 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting House
Judiciary Committee Report on the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, H.R. Rep. 100-711, at
39 (1988), reprinted in, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 2173, 2200).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
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3610(a) of this title.” 88 The relevant text from the Judiciary Committee’s
comments to this section states, “An aggrieved person is not required to
exhaust the administrative process before filing a civil action, [t]he
Committee intends for the administrative proceeding to be a primary, but
not exclusive, method for persons aggrieved by discriminatory housing
practices to seek redress[],” and is found in the legislative history
discussing § 813 of Public Law 100-430, as codified, § 3613. 89 Thus, it
is clear that the House Judiciary Committee report cited by the Bryant
Woods Inn Court is specifically referencing § 3613(a), which in turn
references § 3610. The “administrative process” provided under § 3610
refers only to the process of filing a complaint with the HUD Secretary,
not a locality-provided administrative remedy such as an appeal from an
adverse decision regarding a request for reasonable accommodation. 90
The Bryant Woods Inn Court either missed this essential limiting
relationship, or chose to ignore it.
Further, had the Committee wished to indicate it wanted to eliminate
all exhaustion requirements, including those imposed by the judiciary, it
could have used the phrase “an administrative proceeding,” thereby
suggesting that perhaps the administrative proceeding referenced through
§ 3610 was merely illustrative. Instead, the Committee used the singular
“the administrative proceeding,” suggesting it was concerned with the
proceeding where a complainant files a discrimination complaint with
the HUD Secretary and HUD investigates the complaint as provided by §
3610. Therefore, it is improper to make inferences about Congressional
exhaustion intent from the House Judiciary Committee’s statement that it
intended to foreclose the judiciary from imposing exhaustion in
reasonable accommodation cases. 91
C. Historical Analysis
The final indication that the Committee’s comments were not
referring to locality-provided administrative remedies is the context in
which the FHAA’s enforcement provisions and its inclusion of
handicapped individuals arose. The primary purpose of the FHAA was to

88. Id. § 3613(a)(1)(B)(2).
89. H.R. REP. 100-711, at 28.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1994).
91. For a reasonable accommodation case in which the court stated that judicially-imposed
exhaustion might be appropriate, see Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43, 46 (6th
Cir. 1992). There, a group-home operator sued a city after the city’s law director denied a reasonable
accommodation request. Id. at 44–46. The court stated, albeit in dicta, “[a] puzzling aspect of this
appeal is disregard below for whether the case was ripe for consideration by the district court, since
plaintiff may have failed to exhaust administrative remedies that could have afforded it immediate
and complete relief.” Id. at 46.
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enhance the enforcement mechanisms available to HUD and the
Attorney General. 92 While the inclusion of handicapped individuals and
families cannot be accurately termed as an afterthought, it is clear the
enforcement provisions and the handicapped individual’s provisions are
separate and distinct. In fact, the only intersection between the
enforcement provision and the provisions for handicapped individuals
suggests that Congress intended the new administrative process to be
unrelated to failures to make reasonable accommodation for handicapped
individuals. Section 3610(g)(C) provides that “[i]f the Secretary
determines that the matter involves the legality of any State or local
zoning or other land use law or ordinance, the Secretary shall
immediately refer the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate
action under section 814 [42 U.S.C. § 3614], instead of [commencing
with the administrative process].” 93 Thus, Congress specifically provides
in the statute that the administrative process is not to be used in instances
where localities allegedly violate the FHA by failing to make a
reasonable accommodation. This further supports the argument that the
statement by the Committee regarding the primary, but not exclusive,
nature of the administrative process does not refer to reasonable
accommodation cases.
D. Implications of an Interactive Process Requirement
Additionally, a judicially-imposed exhaustion requirement may
effectuate a proper interactive, iterative process with the individual
requesting a reasonable accommodation. The FHAA’s plain language
does not include a requirement that an entity engage in an informal
interactive process with an individual with a disability who requests an
accommodation. 94 However, the Fair Housing Act Amendment of 1988,
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 all evidence the common Congressional intent to provide a
“clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 95 Thus, some courts

92. See H.R. REP. 100-711, supra note 12.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(C) (1994). Under 3614, Congress gives the Attorney General the
power to “commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court for appropriate
relief with respect to a discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b)(1)(A) (2006).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(f)(3)(B) (2000).
95. Gretchen M. Widmer, Note, We Can Work It Out: Reasonable Accommodation and the
Interactive Process Under the Fair Housing Amendment. 2007 U. ILL. L. REV 761, 766 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C.§ 12101(b)(1); Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc.
v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002)); Kellyann Everly, Comment, A Reasonable
Burden: The Need for a Uniform Burden of Proof Scheme in Reasonable Accommodation Claims, 29
U. DAYTON L. REV. 37, 60–61 (2003).
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have relied on the RA and ADA to impose an interactivity requirement 96
and some scholars have proposed that HUD and Congress should
expressly implement such a requirement. 97
Those courts that have rejected the interactivity requirement have
done so in part because an informal interactive process may be
improper. 98 In Lapid-Laurel, for example, a real estate developer sued a
township for failure, under the FHA, to make a reasonable
accommodation for variances to build a residential-care facility for the
elderly. 99 The township held four public hearings with respect to the
developer’s variance requests, and as a result of these hearings, the
developer’s engineer made multiple changes to the plans. 100 However,
while the changes adequately addressed some of the township’s
concerns, they failed to address crucial concerns, including those of the
fire chief that emergency vehicles might not be able to access the facility,
and the township finally denied the developer’s request for
accommodation. 101 In its civil suit for FHA violation, the developer
argued, in part, that the township “failed to engage in an ‘informal
interactive process’ with [the developer].” 102 In holding that the FHAA
does not require localities to engage in an informal interactive process,
the court reasoned that imposing such a requirement might
“compromis[e] the important policies underlying state law limitation on
off-the-record contacts between developers and board members, such as
limiting the potential for corruption of local officials.” 103
The tension between the Third and Seventh Circuits 104 about whether
there should be an informal interactive process 105 can be resolved and the
benefits to an interactive process noted by scholars can be achieved
through the use of a judicially-imposed exhaustion requirement. The
locality-provided appeals process is on the record, thereby resolving the
concerns of the Third Circuit in Lapid-Laurel that an informal process
may lead to corruption. Additionally, the appeals process may allow
litigants to amend their request in response to an official denial and have
96. See, e.g. Jankowski Lee & Assocs v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
there is no interactivity requirement).
97. See Widmer, supra note 95.
98. Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 456 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).
99. Id. at 446–47.
100. Id. at 447.
101. Id. at 447-48.
102. Id. at 450.
103. Id. at 456 n.7.
104. Id. at 450; Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1996).
105. Widmer, supra note 95, at 782. (“[I]t is in both the landlord’s and the tenant’s best
interests to engage in an interactive process. . . . Informal discussions regarding reasonable
accommodations are inexpensive and are surely less costly than potential litigation resulting from a
landlord’s failure to reasonably accommodate the tenant.” (emphasis added)).
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their request granted without the expense of litigation to either party.
Therefore, room exists for courts to encourage entities to engage in a
formal appeals process through the imposition of an exhaustion
requirement, at least in some cases.
E. Pre-FHAA Cases
The Supreme Court in Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood held that a
party need not exhaust their administrative remedies under the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 before bringing suit in federal court, 106 and postFHAA cases have cited Gladstone for the proposition that the FHAA
does not contain a requirement that a party must exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit for failure to make a
reasonable accommodation under the FHAA. 107 In Gladstone, home
buyers sued real estate brokerage firms for directing potential buyers to
certain neighborhoods based on race. 108 The brokerage firms argued that
the buyers lacked standing because they had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. 109 The court rejected that argument and
concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that Congress intended to
condition access to the courts on a prior resort to the federal agency. To
the contrary, the history suggests that all Title VIII complainants were to
have available immediate judicial review.” 110
Post-FHAA cases such as Lihosit v. San Diego Housing Commission
subsequently applied the Gladstone court’s reasoning to reasonable
accommodation requests before a local state-agency. 111 However, preFHAA cases such as Gladstone are inapposite to an analysis of whether a
judicially-imposed exhaustion requirement is appropriate under the
FHAA. For example, assume that the Gladstone court is correct and
Congress did indeed intend that all Title VIII complainants were to have
immediate judicial review. The only thing that can be accurately inferred
from this is that Congress evaluated the remedies provided by the federal
agency and the remedy provided by federal courts and concluded that
imposing an exhaustion requirement in federal cases could not be
justified. It did not, indeed could not, evaluate a local state agency’s
remedies for denial of a request for reasonable accommodation. And
important differences exist between a remedy provided by HUD and a

106. 441 U.S. 91, 106 (1979).
107. See, e.g., Lihosit v. San Diego Hous. Comm’n, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94208 at *16
(S.D.C.A. 2006).
108. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 93–94.
109. Id. at 104.
110. Id. at 106.
111. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94208 at *15–16.
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locality. First, separation-of-powers issues are raised where the judiciary
gets involved in a HUD administrative proceeding before the issue is
exhausted before a Congressionally-created administrative agency.112
Likewise, proceedings before a state agency raise the same issues plus
the issue that implementing zoning regulations (the subject of many
reasonable-accommodation requests) 113 is one of the most essential
functions of local government entities. 114
Additionally, a locality-provided administrative remedy is
fundamentally different from the HUD administrative remedy in what it
offers to the handicapped individual. With a federal administrative
remedy, the handicapped individual must contact HUD, file a complaint,
and then wait while the Secretary does its own investigation and attempts
to reconcile the parties. With a locality-provided remedy, the process is
much more direct and has the potential to provide the handicapped
individual with immediate relief. A judicially-imposed exhaustion
requirement will promote judicial efficiency by mooting the controversy
and allowing the Appeals Board to correct its errors and by allowing the
parties to develop a more substantial factual record for review. As the
district court noted in Bryant Woods Inn, 115 local appeals boards have the
power to grant relief, and unless there is evidence to suggest the board
has predetermined the issue, exhaustion may allow the aggrieved party to
receive immediate resolution. Finally, prudential use of an exhaustion
requirement properly recognizes that zoning is quintessentially a function
of local government.
Therefore, because Congress failed to explicitly state whether a
handicapped individual must exhaust their locality-provided
administrative remedies, because the historical context of the FHAA
does not logically indicate Congress would have eliminated an
exhaustion requirement, and because judicial economy counsels in favor
of imposing an exhaustion requirement, courts should not, as a matter of
routine, hold that a party need not exhaust its locality-provided
administrative remedies before bringing suit in court. Further, as
112. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (“[T]he exhaustion doctrine recognizes
the notion, grounded in deference to Congress’ delegation of authority to coordinate branches of
Government, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that
Congress has charged them to administer.”).
113. See, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997); Groome
Resources, Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000); Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v.
Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1996); Oxford House-A v. City of Univ. City, 87 F.3d 1022 (8th
Cir. 1996); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
114. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 51 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2224. (“[Z]oning is quintessentially a local government decision. It is one of the most important,
jealously guarded powers of the local government. It goes to the very heart of a community’s
character, growth, development, commercialization, mix of housing, and so forth.”).
115. 911 F. Supp. 918, 926–27 (D. Md. 1996).
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discussed in the next section, the locality-provided appeals process
should not be characterized as an administrative remedy. Rather, it
should be considered part of the administrative process through which all
litigants must proceed prior to having received a final decision.
V. RIPENESS AND THE MISAPPLICATION OF TAKINGS CASES IN BRYANT
WOODS INN AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
In addition to Bryant Woods Inn’s improperly foreclosing a judicially
imposed exhaustion requirement, takings cases such as Williamson
County 116 suggest that rather than being a true “administrative remedy,”
a locality-provided administrative appeal from an adverse reasonable
accommodation decision may be characterized as merely part of the
administrative process through which a party must go before it can be
said to have received a final decision. Also, Bryant Woods Inn
considered only whether the dispute was constitutionally ripe, failing to
address prudential ripeness. Finally, this section will address the
confusion between the ripeness and administrative remedy exhaustion
doctrines.
A. The Administrative Process Under Williamson County and County
Concrete
In Bryant Woods Inn, the county, citing Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 117 argued that the nursing home
operator “must make a ‘meaningful application’ according to Howard
County’s standards so as to allow the County to take a ‘final, definitive
position’ on that application, in order to satisfy the ripeness
requirement.” 118 Further, the County argued, that meaningful application
necessarily included an appeal to the Howard County Board of
Appeals. 119 The court rejected this argument, holding that “[w]hile the
county must be afforded an opportunity to make a final decision, the
issue is sufficiently concrete for judicial resolution once an
accommodation is denied. Fair Housing Act claims are thus unlike
takings claims, which do not ripen until post-decisional procedures are
invoked without achieving a just compensation.” 120 The court reasoned
that the “difference is attributable to the fact constitutional injury under
116. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
117. Id. at 191.
118. Reply Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), 1996 WL 33453737 at 13.
119. Bryant Woods Inn v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 601 (4th Cir. 1997).
120. Id. at 602.
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the Just Compensation Clause does not arise ‘unless or until the state
fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation [sic] remedy for the property
loss.’” 121 The court compared this to claims under the Fair Housing Act,
and without citation to any authority, reasoned that “[u]nder the Fair
Housing Act, however, a violation occurs when the disabled resident is
first denied a reasonable accommodation, irrespective of the remedies
granted in subsequent proceedings.” 122 However, an analysis of
Williamson County and its progeny reveals that the Bryant Woods Inn
court may have mischaracterized the appeals process as an administrative
remedy, rather than characterizing it as part of the administrative
procedure necessary to receive a final decision.
In Williamson County, a bank sued a county, arguing that its zoning
scheme constituted a taking without just compensation. 123 The Court
held that the bank’s claim was not yet ripe because it had failed to seek a
variance, and thus had failed to receive a final decision as to how the
scheme would be applied to its property. 124 Second, even if it had
received a final decision, it had failed to go “through the procedures” the
state had provided for seeking just compensation once a taking
occurred. 125 The court reasoned that “if a State provides an adequate
procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot
claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the
procedure and been denied just compensation.” Thus, the Bryant Woods
Inn court was correct that under a takings analysis, there is a two-step
analytical procedure—first, whether there has been a taking, and second,
whether just compensation has been received—that is not present under
the Fair Housing Act. However, the progeny of Williamson County, the
case the court cites for this proposition, suggests that the court may have
incorrectly characterized the appeals procedure as a “remedy” when it
stated that “a violation occurs when the disabled resident is first denied a
reasonable accommodation, irrespective of the remedies granted in
subsequent proceedings.” 126
Over twenty years after Williamson County, the Third Circuit made
explicit what the Supreme Court implied in Williamson County—that
before a locality can be said to have denied just compensation, it must
have exhausted the procedure for seeking just compensation before its
claim would be ripe. 127 The court noted that while there is no exhaustion
121. Id. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williamson County Reg’l
Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 195)..
122. Id.
123. 473 U.S. at 175.
124. Id. at 190.
125. Id. at 195.
126. Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 602.
127. County Concrete Corp v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006).
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of administrative remedies requirement that an aggrieved party must
meet before bringing a takings claim, the procedure through which an
aggrieved party must go to receive just compensation for an alleged
taking is not a “true exhaustion of state remedies requirement,” but
rather, it is merely part of the process through which a party must go
before it can allege a taking without just compensation. 128 Thus, the
court held that the district court correctly concluded that the aggrieved
party had failed to satisfy the just compensation prong of the Williamson
County test, where the party failed to appeal an adverse state court
decision to the New Jersey Supreme Court. 129
An appeal of an adverse decision regarding a request for a reasonable
accommodation should not be termed an “administrative remedy.” Just
as a takings litigant must complete the process for receiving just
compensation, including appealing final adverse lower-court decisions
prior to their takings claim’s ripening, so might a reasonable
accommodation litigant need to complete the process for receiving a
reasonable accommodation, including appealing an adverse decision to a
board of appeals. The Bryant Woods Inn court’s statement that FHA
claims are different than a takings claims because “[u]nder the Fair
Housing Act . . . a violation occurs when the disabled resident is first
denied a reasonable accommodation, irrespective of the remedies granted
in subsequent proceedings” 130 is unsupported by the text of the FHAA
and the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the Fifth Amendment provides “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation,” 131 while the FHA provides that unlawful discrimination
includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations.” 132 Just as an
appeal in the takings just compensation process is not a “true” state
remedy, neither is an appeal in the reasonable accommodation process a
“true” administrative remedy. Therefore, courts should not excuse a
reasonable accommodation plaintiff from exhausting a locality’s

128. Id. at 168.
129. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
[a]lthough the District Court correctly determined that the facial Just Compensation
Takings claim failed to satisfy the second Williamson prong at the time of the motion to
dismiss, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied review of appellants’ state court appeal
while this appeal was pending before us. Accordingly, the second Williamson prong no
longer prevents appellants from asserting that the mere enactment of the Ordinance
deprived them of the economically viable use of their property, and, thus, we will reverse
the District Court’s conclusion that the claim was unripe.
Id. (Internal citations omitted.) Thus, by negative inference, had the party not exhausted the just
compensation procedure through its appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the court would have
held the claim to be unripe.
130. Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 602.
131. U.S. CONST., AMEND. 5.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2006).
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procedure on the erroneous ground, 133 that Congress intended there to be
no exhaustion of locality-provided administrative remedies under the
FHA.
B. Constitutional and Prudential Ripeness
Additionally, Bryant Woods Inn considered only whether the dispute
was constitutionally ripe, failing to address prudential ripeness. The court
concluded that a dispute between a group home operator and the county
was ripe because the dispute was sufficiently concrete for judicial
decision. 134 The court failed to distinguish whether it was evaluating
constitutional or prudential ripeness, or both. 135 However, prudential
ripeness counsels against a court’s exercising jurisdiction not when a
dispute is insufficiently concrete, but when it “will be better decided
later.” 136 And, while the court noted that the ripeness analysis included
an evaluation of the hardship likely to be suffered by the individual,
suggesting a prudential ripeness analysis, 137 the court failed to analyze
the hardship to the group home operator. 138 Rather, the court stated that
“[w]hile the county must be afforded an opportunity to make a final
decision, the issue is sufficiently concrete for judicial resolution once an
accommodation is [initially] denied.” 139 This suggests the court was
evaluating the dispute’s ripeness from a constitutional and not a
prudential standpoint. Because an administrative remedy may cause a
dispute to never occur 140 and where the challenged action does not create
an immediate dilemma for the handicapped individual, 141 the prudential
ripeness doctrine counsels in favor of a judicially-imposed exhaustion
requirement.

133. See infra Part IV, (arguing that there is nothing to suggest Congress intended to eliminate
a requirement that reasonable accommodation plaintiffs exhaust locality-provided administrative
remedies, assuming that appeals from initial decisions are truly administrative remedies and not
merely part of the necessary procedure to obtain a final decision).
134. Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 602.
135. See id. at 601–02.
136. New York Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008).
137. See McInnis-Misenor v. Maine Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70 (2003) (“The second pronghardship-is entirely prudential.”).
138. See Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 601–03.
139. Id. at 602.
140. See Am. Sav. Bank, FSB v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 436, 440 (2d Cir. 2003).
141. Such as situation, where the action does not create an immediate dilemma, might arise in
a situation very like Bryant Woods Inn, where a residential facility for persons with disabilities
makes a request for accommodation to allow it to expand its operations in anticipation of an increase
in demand, but cannot show that there is a lack of suitable housing for the handicapped individuals it
wishes to serve. See Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 601.
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C. Confusion Between the Ripeness and Administrative Remedy
Exhaustion Doctrines
The point at which a proceeding may become a remedy, and thus
subject to exhaustion, bears some discussion. In his 1998 article, Robert
L. Schonfeld argues that when the Seventh and Eighth Circuits denied
FHA reasonable accommodation cases for lack of ripeness, they were, in
effect, imposing an exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement. 142 While the doctrines of ripeness and exhaustion of
administrative remedies are similar in some respects, and while the line
between the two is unclear, 143 the two must not be conflated. For, if they
were, localities’ liability for failure to make a reasonable accommodation
would skyrocket while handicapped individuals’ ability to get a
reasonable accommodation would be virtually unchanged. As the two
cases 144 are very similar, 145 I will analyze United States v. Village of
Palatine.
In Palatine, a non-profit group home organization, Oxford House,
established a group home for recovering drug and alcohol addicts in the
Village of Palatine in an area zoned for single family homes. 146 While
the village’s zoning ordinance included properly licensed group homes
with eight or fewer residents, the group home was not licensed and had
eleven residents. 147 After being cited by the village for zoning violations,
but before making a request for reasonable accommodation, Oxford
House sued the village for failure to make a reasonable accommodation
as required under the FHA. 148 The court agreed with the village’s
argument that it should not be considered to have refused to make an
accommodation because “Oxford House[] never invoked the procedures
to make such an accommodation.” 149 The court reasoned that until
Oxford House makes an application for a reasonable accommodation, the
village could not authorize a variance, and thus, the issue was not ripe.
For, if the village had not had the chance to consider a reasonable
accommodation request, it could hardly be said that “the initial

142. Robert L. Schonfeld, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under the Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 427 (1998).
143. Wright, supra note 33, at 85.
144. United States v. Vill. of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994); Oxford House-C v. City
of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996).
145. Schonfeld, supra note 142, at 427. The two cases involved nearly identical actions by the
same entity, Oxford House, a non-profit drug and alcohol treatment organization. See Palatine, 37
F.3d at 1231; Oxford House, 77 F.3d at 250–51.
146. Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1231–32.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1232.
149. Id. at 1233.
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decisionmaker has arrived at a definite position on the issue that inflicts
an actual, concrete injury.” 150
As the Supreme Court noted in Williamson County, the finality
aspect of ripeness is separate from the administrative remedy exhaustion
requirement; “an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision
and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise
inappropriate.” 151 To conflate the two would only serve to provide
entities with a tool by which they could bring bad-faith suits against
localities. It would allow entities to entirely ignore all zoning ordinances,
and when localities tried to enforce the ordinance, the locality would find
itself embroiled in a potentially expensive civil suit. In addition to being
expensive for the locality, civil suits would likely be expensive for the
handicapped individual. And, in those situations where the locality
would have made an accommodation if the individual had just asked for
it, the result of the suit is that the locality would likely make a reasonable
accommodation. Thus, handicapped individuals’ ability to get an
accommodation would effectively be unchanged. In this context, the
ripeness and exhaustion doctrines serve two different and important
purposes, and it is dangerous to conflate them.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Bryant Woods Inn, the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted and
misapplied the Judiciary Committee’s statement that the newly-created
administrative proceeding was not intended to be the exclusive remedy.
The court also incorrectly interpreted the legislative intent behind the
Judiciary Committee’s statement to mean that an exhaustion requirement
for locality-provided administrative remedies should be eliminated.
While some subsequent cases may have correctly distinguished between
HUD remedies and locality-provided remedies, the two are unrelated,
and intent with respect to one does not reflect intent with respect to the
other. Thus, a place exists for judicially-imposed exhaustion
requirements in limited reasonable accommodation disputes under the
FHAA. Additionally, the administrative process through which a litigant
must go to determine whether it has been denied just compensation in a
takings case is analogous to the administrative process in a reasonable
accommodation case an appeal of an adverse reasonable accommodation
request is merely part of the locality-provided process, not an

150. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193
(1985).
151. Id.
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administrative remedy. Thus, a reasonable accommodation claim may
not be ripe until a litigant has appealed an adverse decision.
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